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ON INFLUENCE AND COMPROMISE
IN TWO-TIER VOTING SYSTEMS
GEOFFREY R. GRIMMETT
Abstract. We examine two aspects of the mathematical basis for two-tier voting
systems, such as that of the Council of the European Union. These aspects concern
the use of square-root weights and the choice of quota.
Square-root weights originate in the Penrose square-root system, which assumes
that votes are cast independently and uniformly at random, and is based around the
concept of equality of influence of the voters across the Union. There are (at least)
two distinct definitions of influence in current use in probability theory, namely,
absolute and conditional influence. These are in agreement when the underlying
random variables are independent, but not generally. We review their possible
implications for two-tier voting systems, especially in the context of the so-called
collective bias model. We show that the two square-root laws invoked by Penrose
are unified through the use of conditional influence.
In an elaboration of the square-root system, S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski have
proposed an exact value for the quota q = q∗ to be achieved in a successful vote
of a two-tier system, and they have presented numerical and theoretical evidence
in its support. We indicate some numerical and mathematical issues arising in
the use of a Gaussian (or normal) approximation in this context, and we propose
that other values of q may be as good if not better than q∗. We discuss certain
aspects of the relationship between theoreticians and politicians in the design of a
two-tier voting system, and we reach the conclusion that the choice of quota in the
square-root system is an issue for politicians informed by theory.
1. Introduction and background
1.1. Preamble. Mathematics is fundamental to the design and analysis of voting
systems (see, for example, the books [3, 10, 16, 36, 43]). Mathematical models
for human behaviour frequently involve probability, and they invariably rely upon
assumptions whose validity is ripe for debate. As a general rule, the greater are the
assumptions, the more precise are the conclusions. A balance needs be struck between
tractability and applicability: excessive assumptions tend to undermine practical
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relevance, whereas “nothing will come of nothing” [Shakespeare]. Assumption-based
conclusions must be exposed to a robustness analysis: to what degree are they robust
when the underlying assumptions are perturbed?
These issues are illustrated here in a study of the so-called Jagiellonian Compro-
mise (JagCom) of S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski [49, 50, 51, 55]. The JagCom is a
proposal for a two-tier voting system such as that of the Council of the European
Union (see Section 1.3 for further details). It is based on (i) square-root weights cou-
pled with (ii) a certain formula for the quota. While the current work was born out
of an interest in learning about the JagCom, it has developed into (i) a broader study
of the notion of power (or influence) for general probability distributions, combined
with (ii) a critical analysis of the arguments leading to the given quota. The conclu-
sions of this article illuminate the balance between theory and practical relevance.
The political context of this paper is as follows. The debate rolls on concern-
ing the allocation of seats in the European Parliament (EP) between the Member
States of the EU (see, for example, [12, 44]). It has been argued by members of the
Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) of the EP that strategic reform of the
somewhat ad hoc method of allocation of parliamentary seats should be considered
only in parallel to a review of the two-tier voting system of the EU Council. The
JagCom is a leading theoretical contender for implementation in the Council. It
has been supported in two open letters to EU governments, [8, 9], signed by signifi-
cant numbers of prominent theoreticians, and it has been the subject of a volume of
positive publicity including [30, 38, 45, 52, 56]. The discussion in Brussels is likely
to intensify in the months and years to come, and this is a propitious moment to
re-examine the JagCom in some detail.
There are two principal parts to this paper, as outlined in the following two subsec-
tions. The first concerns the definition of the ‘power’ of an individual (as introduced
by Penrose) for general probability distributions. This is connected to the choice of
weights in a two-tier voting system such as the JagCom. The second is a discussion
of the choice of quota in the JagCom.
1.2. Power and influence. Lionel Penrose’s 1946 paper [41] is a fundamental work
in the mathematical theory of voting, and it has received a great deal of attention.
Penrose found it convenient to assume that members of a population choose their
votes independently at random, and are equally likely to choose either of the two
possible outcomes. These assumptions of independence and unbiasedness lead to a
mathematically sophisticated theory based around the classical study of the sums of
so-called independent and identically distributed (‘iid’), symmetric random variables
(see [42], or the less sophisticated account [24, Sect. 5.10]). That said, independence
and unbiasedness may, in practice, be far from the truth in specific cases.
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The square-root voting system of Penrose [41] is prominent in discussion of two-tier
voting systems in general, and in specific of that of the Council of the European Union
(see, for example, [27, 55]). The challenge confronted by Penrose is to devise a system
for pooling the views of a number of Member States with varying population sizes.
What weight wj should be assigned to the opinion of State j, having a population
of size Nj? The Penrose system amounts to the proposal wj ∝
√
Nj . The essence
of Penrose’s argument is the observation that the number H of heads shown in Nj
independent, unbiased coin tosses satisfies
(1.1) E
∣∣H − 1
2
Nj
∣∣ ∼√2Nj/π, for large Nj.
(Here and later, E denotes expectation, and P denotes probability.) We shall refer
to (1.1) as Penrose’s second square-root law. The reader is referred back to [41] for
the deduction of square-root weights from (1.1), although s/he may prefer to read
Kirsch’s least-squares argument as presented in Section 3.2. (Although (1.1), and
the subsequent (1.2), are asymptotic relations, sharp bounds may be obtained by
elementary methods.)
Remark 1.1. Penrose defines the ‘edge’ as |NF−NA|, where NF (respectively, NA) is
the number of votes in favour (respectively, against) the motion. It is immediate that
|NF −NA| = |H− (Nj−H)| = |2H−Nj |, so that the mean edge equals 2E|H− 12Nj|.
Penrose [41] discussed also the concept of the ‘power’ (termed ‘influence’ in the
current work, after [6, 47]) of an individual voter within a given election or vote.
He noted that, in a vote within a State containing Nj individuals whose votes are
independent and unbiased, this power, denoted αj , has order
(1.2) αj ∼
√
2/(πNj), for large Nj ,
(see also Banzhaf [4]). We shall refer to (1.2) as Penrose’s first square-root law.
Only one square-root is sometimes attributed to Penrose. In [41], he stated (1.1)
and he proved (1.2), and he did not note their inter-relationship. Some later authors
have linked (1.1) and (1.2) by proposing a weight w′j for State j such that the product
αjw
′
j does not depend on population-size, that is, w
′
j ∝
√
Nj , in agreement with (1.1)
(see, for example, the discussion at [52, p. 48 ff.] and [55, Sect. 1]). This argument
appears to assume that: (i) in a population with size Nj and individual power αj, the
collective power is αjNj , and (ii) 1/αj has, generically, the same order as E|H− 12Nj|.
The first assumption here is open to discussion, and the second is false for general
distributions. Proposition 2.5 and Remark 2.6 explain the true relationship between
(1.1) and (1.2) in the context of general probability distributions.
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The square-root laws of this article are those of Penrose [41]. It is not the current
purpose to discuss in detail the relationship between voting power and voting weight
(see, for example, [2, 16, 39]).
In Section 2, we introduce the notions of the absolute and the conditional influences
of an individual in an election. The absolute influence is that considered by Penrose
and later authors; the conditional influence is sometimes considered more appropriate
in situations where individuals’ votes are dependent random variables. The two
quantities are equal in the independent case, but not generally so.
1.3. The Jagiellonian Compromise, a two-tier voting system. In a method
since dubbed the ‘Jagiellonian Compromise’ (JagCom), S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski
[49, 50, 51, 55] have proposed the following two-tier voting system using square-root
weights together with a particular value q∗ for the quota q. Writing N1, N2, . . . , Ns
for the populations of the s States of the Union, under the JagCom a motion is
passed if and only if
(1.3)
∑
j∈J
√
Nj −
∑
j∈J
√
Nj > q
∗W,
where J is the set of States voting in favour of the motion, J is the set voting against,
and
q∗ :=
√
N
W
, W =
s∑
j=1
√
Nj , N =
s∑
j=1
Nj .
The value q = q∗ given in (1.3) is supported by a heuristic argument based on
approximation by a Gaussian distribution. Although no rigorous justification of this
approximation is yet available (see Appendix C of the current work), its conclusions
gain some support using exact numerical methods (see Section 4.2). Note that the
q∗ of (1.3) is not quite the quota of [51], but rather that of [26].
Salient features of two-tier voting systems are summarised in Section 3, with special
attention to the work of Kirsch [26, 27] and S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski [49, 50, 51,
55]. This is followed by a discussion in Section 4 and Appendix C of the influences
of the weighted States within the Council, and of the use and potential misuse of
the Gaussian approximation in estimating certain related probabilities. The closing
Section 5 contains some reflections on the JagCom, and in particular the following
conclusions.
1. The JagCom is derived via a set of principles that can be stated unambigu-
ously and analysed rigorously, and the resulting system is robust with respect
to population changes. Nevertheless, these principles are arguably fragile and
unrealistic, and insufficiently sensitive to political realities.
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2. Despite fragility in the assumptions about voting patterns made by the Jag-
Com, we offer no superior alternative here. The problem of allocating weights
is more than just a mathematical puzzle, but demands a more extensive po-
litical vision.
3. The justification for the proposed JagCom quota q∗ is empirical and numerical
rather than rigorous. These numerics provide only equivocal guidance which
is satisfied by a range of values of the quota, including the simpler value
q = 0. Indeed, q = 0 is the value for which individual powers are maximized.
Given the very modest differences in performance between such values of the
quota, the final choice is best determined through political input.
1.4. Resume´. Certain assumptions appear to be necessary for the above analyses,
and these are examined in the current article. There are four areas that receive
special attention, namely:
(a) the underlying model in which individuals vote according to an unbiased coin
toss, independently of other voters [Section 2.3],
(b) an alternative interpretation of the concept of ‘voting power’ or ‘influence’
[Section 2.2],
(c) the assumptions of mathematical smoothness under which the Gaussian ap-
proximation is suitable for finite populations [Appendix C],
(d) some implications of exact computations of voting powers in two-tier systems
[Section 4.2].
Numerous earlier authors have of course considered some of these issues, namely (a),
(c), and (d), and we mention [27, 31, 35, 37, 46, 51].
Remark 1.2 (on the literature). There is an extensive existing literature on the
matters considered in this article, and the author has attempted to include appropriate
references. Apologies are offered to those authors whose work is not listed explicitly.
2. Absolute and conditional influence
2.1. The history and context of influence. The concept of ‘influence’ is central
in the probability theory of disordered systems. Consider a system that comprises
m sub-systems. These could be, for example, individual voters in an election, nodes
in a disordered medium (as in the percolation model), or particles in a model for
the ferromagnet (such as the Ising/Potts models). In studying the behaviour of the
collective system, it is often key to understand the effect of a variation within a given
sub-system. That is, what is the probability that a change in a given sub-system has
a substantial effect on the collective system?
The quantification of influence is long recognised as being central to the under-
standing of complex random systems. For example, influence in voting systems was
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studied by Ben-Or and Linial [6] in work that played an important role in stimulating
a systematic theory of influence and sharp threshold with many applications in ran-
dom systems (see [25] for a review). In percolation theory, the influence of a node is
the probability that the node is pivotal for a given global event (see (2.3) for the def-
inition of pivotality). Estimates for influence are key to most of the principal results
for percolation (see [21], for example). In these two areas above, the sub-systems are
generally taken to be independent random variables. This is, however, not so for a
number of important processes of statistical mechanics including the Ising and Potts
models, in which the sub-systems are dependent but usually positively correlated.
For such systems, ‘influence’ requires a new definition, and this is provided in [19, 20]
in the context of the Ising and random-cluster models (see [22]).
The origins of influence are rather older than the above work, and go back at least
to the work of Penrose [41] in 1946 and possibly the reliability literature surveyed by
Barlow and Proschan [5] in 1965. The two definitions of influence, referred to above,
are presented next in the context of a voting system (we shall use the standard
terminology of probability theory and the theory of interacting systems).
2.2. Definitions of absolute and conditional influences. There is a population
P containing m individuals, and a vote is taken between two possible outcomes,
labelled +1 and −1. Each individual votes either +1 or −1. We write X(i) for
the vote of person i, and we assume the X(i) are random variables. The vote-
vector X = (X(1), X(2), . . . , X(m)) takes values in the so-called ‘configuration space’
Σ = {−1, 1}m. There exists a predetermined subset A ⊆ Σ, and the vote is declared
to pass if and only if X ∈ A. It is normal to consider sets A which are increasing in
that
(2.1) σ ∈ A, σ ≤ σ′ ⇒ σ′ ∈ A.
The inequality σ ≤ σ′ refers to the natural partial order on Σ given by
σ ≤ σ′ if and only if σ(i) ≤ σ′(i) for all i ∈ P.
For concreteness, we assume henceforth that A is an increasing subset of Σ (that is,
an ‘increasing event’).
For i ∈ P and a configuration σ = (σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(m)) ∈ Σ, we define the
vectors σi, σi by
(2.2) σi(j) =
{
1 if j = i,
σ(j) otherwise,
σi(j) =
{
−1 if j = i,
σ(j) otherwise.
That is, σi (respectively, σi) agrees with σ except possibly at i, with i’s vote set to
1 (respectively, −1). Individual i is called pivotal if the outcome of the vote changes
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when s/he changes opinion (the words decisive and critical are sometimes used in
the voting literature). More formally, i is called pivotal for the configuration σ if
(2.3) σi /∈ A, σi ∈ A.
This holds since A is assumed increasing.
In all situations considered in this paper, the individual votes X(i) are assumed
to be identically distributed and symmetric in that
(2.4) P(X(i) = 1) = P(X(i) = −1) = 1
2
,
where P denotes the probability measure that governs the vote-vector X . Assump-
tions of independence will be introduced where appropriate.
Definition 2.1. We say that the vector X is symmetric if
(i) X and −X have the same distributions, and
(ii) for all i 6= j there exists a permutation π of {1, 2, . . . , m} with πi = j such
that X and πX have the same distribution, where πX denotes the permuted
vector (Xpi1, Xpi2, . . . , Xpim).
Condition (ii) above is weaker than requiring that X be exchangeable, and an
example is included in Appendix A.
Definition 2.2. Let A be an increasing event.
(a) The absolute influence of voter i is
α(i) := P(X i ∈ A)− P(Xi ∈ A)
= P(Xi /∈ A, X i ∈ A).
(b) The conditional influence of voter i is
κ(i) := P(A | X(i) = 1)− P(A | X(i) = −1).
The so-called ‘power index’, or the Banzhaf (or Banzhaf–Penrose) power index in
the impartial culture context, is the term used by many authors for the absolute
influence given above.
When P is a product measure (that is, the X(i) are independent), it may be seen
that α(i) = κ(i), and the common value α is termed simply influence by Russo [47]
and Ben-Or and Linial [6] (and power by Penrose [41]). Equality does not generally
hold when P is not a product measure. The above concept of ‘conditional influence’
was identified in [19], where it was shown to be the correct adaptation of absolute
influence in proofs of sharp-threshold theorems for certain families of dependent mea-
sures arising in stochastic geometry and statistical physics. It has featured recently
in work [32] on so-called prediction values within probabilistic games.
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Remark 2.3 (Success probability). The success probability η(i) of voter i is the
probability that i votes on the winning side, that is,
η(i) := P
(
A ∩ {X(i) = 1})+ P(A ∩ {X(i) = −1}),
where A is the complement of A. See, for example, [11, 36]. If the X(i) satisfy (2.4),
the conditional influence is related to the success probability by the relation
(2.5) η(i) = 1
2
(1 + κ(i)),
see [16, Thm 3.2.16] and [41, Sect. 2(a)]. This relation is, in fact, the key step in
the proof of the forthcoming Proposition 2.5. The success probabilities feature in the
recent work of Kirsch [28].
2.3. Examples of influences. There follow three examples of calculations that
illustrate the differences between absolute and conditional influence. For convenience,
we assume m = 2r + 1 is an odd number, and take A to be the majority event, that
is,
(2.6) A =
{
σ :
∑
i
σ(i) > 0
}
.
It is clear that A is an increasing set. We shall take the X(i) to be Bernoulli random
variables with a shared parameter u which may itself be random. Thus, the X(i) are
not generally independent.
Let U be a random variable taking values in the interval (0, 1). Conditional on
the event U = u, the X(i) are defined to be independent random variables with
(2.7) X(i) =
{
1 with probability u,
−1 with probability 1− u.
If U has a symmetric distribution (in that U and 1 − U are equally distributed),
then the ensuing vote-vector X is symmetric (and, indeed, exchangeable), and this
is called the ‘collective bias’ model by Kirsch [26, 27] (see also [29]). Here are three
examples of collective bias in which the absolute and conditional influences vary
greatly.
1. Independent voting. Let P(U = 1
2
) = 1. The X(i) are independent, unbiased
Bernoulli variables, and
(2.8) α(i) = κ(i) =
(
2r
r
)(
1
2
)2r
∼ 1√
πr
=
√
2
π(m− 1) as m→∞.
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2. Uniform bias. Let U be uniform on the interval (0, 1). Then
(2.9) α(i) =
∫ 1
0
(
2r
r
)
ur(1− u)r du = 1
m
, κ(i) =
1
2
+ o(1).
3. Polarised bias. Let P(U = 1
3
) = P(U = 2
3
) = 1
2
. There exists γ > 0 such that
(2.10) α(i) = o(e−γm), κ(i) =
1
3
+ o(1).
We remind the reader that f(m) = o(g(m)) means f(m)/g(m)→ 0 as m→∞. The
success probabilities in Cases 1–3 follow by (2.5) from the above calculations.
Cases 2 and 3 are exemplars of more general situations in which: (2′) the distri-
bution of U on some neighbourhood of 1
2
is absolutely continuous (see, for example,
[17, p. 674]), and (3′) U is almost surely bounded away from 1
2
(see, for example, the
formulation of [31, p. 592]).
Remark 2.4. Only in the case of independence does the absolute influence have
the order of the square root 1/
√
m. In the two other situations above, the absolute
influence is as small as 1/m and e−γm, respectively. This illustrates the fragility of
the square-root laws (1.1), (1.2) and their consequences for voting (see [34]).
Further discussion of the relationship between absolute and conditional influence
may be found in [19, Sect. 2]. A review of influence for product measures is found at
[25], see also [23, Sect. 4.5]. Uniform bias was discussed in [46], and polarised bias
in [19]. Conditional influence is essentially the prediction value of [32].
2.4. Penrose’s two square-root laws unified. We present next an elementary
application of conditional influence (the proof is found at the end of the section).
We will see its relevance in the discussion of the Penrose square-root laws in Remark
2.6.
Proposition 2.5. Let m = 2r + 1 be odd. Assume that X and −X have the same
distributions, and let A be the majority event of (2.6). Then S =
∑m
i=1X(i) satisfies
E|S| =
m∑
i=1
κ(i).
If X is symmetric, then κ = κ(i) is constant and E|S| = mκ.
We next interpret Proposition 2.5 in the language of Penrose, see Section 1.2.
Consider a population of size Nj , and suppose the corresponding vote-vector X =
(X(1), X(2), . . . , X(Nj)) is symmetric. Then κ = κ(i) does not depend on i. The
number H of people voting 1 satisfies H = 1
2
(S + Nj), so that, by Proposition 2.5
with m = Nj,
(2.11) E
∣∣H − 1
2
Nj
∣∣ = 1
2
Njκ.
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In conclusion, E|H − 1
2
Nj| grows in the manner of
√
Nj if and only if κ behaves in
the manner of 1/
√
Nj.
Remark 2.6. In the language of Penrose [41], the mean ‘edge’ differs from the
conditional influence by the constant multiple Nj. Thus, in the context of general
distributions, conditional influence takes precedence over absolute influence. Pen-
rose’s argument implies that, in a two-tier voting system, the appropriate weight
of state j satisfies wj ∝ Njκ, where κ = κj is the conditional influence. In this
sense, Penrose’s “two” square-root laws are in reality only one, so long as one uses
conditional rather than absolute influences: the asymptotic edge addressed by the
second square-root law is simply a multiple of the asymptotic power addressed by the
first square-root law. When voting is truly independent, the distinction between ab-
solute and conditional influence is nominal only. Seen in the light of Remark 2.3,
Proposition 2.5 supports the thesis that, for general probability measures, the success
probability is a more central quantity than the absolute influence (cf. [36, Sect. 3.6]).
The question arises of deciding the ‘correct’ definition of influence in the general
voting context. There does not seem to be a simple answer to this somewhat philo-
sophical question, which lies beyond the scope of this mathematical paper. Some
minor reflections are offered, within the context of the symmetric voting model of
Definition 2.1.
(a) If we are trying to capture the probability that an individual can, as a theo-
retical exercise in free will, affect the outcome of a vote, then we might favour
absolute influence. This interpretation requires stepping outside the math-
ematical model of Definition 2.1, by postulating the existence of a unique
individual P who votes independently of the rest of the population. Then the
absolute influence of P equals the probability that P’s vote is pivotal.
(b) When different votes are correlated, a sample of one vote contains information
about the other votes. If we wish to gain such information, then conditional
influence is a way to do so. On the other hand, conditional influence contains
very little information about the power of any given individual. When votes
are correlated, individual power tends to be rather small, and sometimes so
small that it ceases to have great value as a discriminator.
(c) Only with the help of a probabilistic model can we calculate influence. An
analysis of the above question depends on the interpretation of ‘chance’ or
‘randomness’ in such a model. Does it make practical sense to model votes as
unbiased random variables? Possibly in response to this question, some au-
thors have argued that the views of voters may not themselves be considered
random, but it is rather the proposals that are random (see, for example, [16,
p. 38] and [26, p. 360]). This interesting suggestion poses some philosophical
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challenges in its own right, not least arising from correlation between the
responses of a given voter to different proposals.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Let 1A denote the indicator function of an event A. Then,
since X and −X have the same distribution,
E|S| = E(S1S>0)− E(S1S<0)
= 2E(S1S>0)
= 2
m∑
i=1
E(Xi1S>0)
=
m∑
i=1
[
P(S > 0 | Xi = 1)− P(S > 0 | Xi = −1)
]
=
m∑
i=1
κ(i).
Subject to symmetry, the constantness of κ(i) holds by choosing suitable permuta-
tions of {1, 2, . . . ., m}. 
3. Two-tier voting
3.1. Two-tier voting systems. We assume there exist s States with respective
populations N1, N2, . . . , Ns (which we take for simplicity to be odd numbers). States
are each allowed one representative on the Council of States. Each State is assumed
to conduct a ballot on a given issue, and the vote of voter i in State j is denoted
Xj(i) ∈ {−1, 1}. The outcome of the vote in state j is taken to be
(3.1) χj :=
{
1 if Sj :=
∑Nj
i=1Xj(i) > 0,
−1 otherwise.
That is, 1
2
(1 + χj) is the indicator function of the event that Sj > 0.
Assumption 3.1 ([26]). We assume the vectors Xj = (Xj(i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , Nj),
j = 1, 2, . . . , s, are independent, which is to say that the votes of different States are
independent. We make no assumption for the moment about the voters of any given
State beyond that, for given j, the vectors Xj are symmetric in that Xj and −Xj
have the same distribution.
To the State j is assigned a weight wj > 0, and we write W =
∑
j wj for the
aggregate weight of the States. The representative of state j votes χj, and the
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weighted sum
V :=
s∑
j=1
wjχj ,
is calculated. The motion is said to pass if
(3.2) V > qW,
and to fail otherwise, where q is a predetermined quota (this is not the quota of [51],
but rather that of [26], see also (1.3)). This voting system depends on the weights
w = (wj) and the quota q, and we refer to it as the (w, q) system.
Since votes are assumed independent between States, the absolute and conditional
influences coincide at the level of the Council.
Question 3.2. How should the weights wj and the quota q be chosen?
We summarise two approaches.
3.2. Penrose/Kirsch and least squares [26, 41]. Penrose has argued that, within
any given state, the strength of a vote is proportional to the mean ‘edge’, that is, the
quantity E|NF −NA| where NF is the number voting for the successful outcome and
NA is the number voting against. Now, NF − NA = Sj , where Sj is given in (3.1).
This motivates the ‘Penrose’ proposal that wj = E|Sj|.
Kirsch [26] has proposed choosing the wj in such a way as to minimise the mean
sum of squared errors
Q := E

[ s∑
j=1
(Sj − wjχj)
]2 .
A quick proof of the following proposition is given at the end of the subsection.
Proposition 3.3 ([26, Thm 2.1]). Subject to Assumption 3.1, the quantity Q is
minimised when wj = E|Sj| for j = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Thus, Kirsch’s least-squares principle leads to the Penrose solution wj = E|Sj|,
which we call the majority rule. As explained by Kirsch, this motivates the choice
(3.3) wj =
{√
Nj if there is no long-range order,
Nj if there is long-range order,
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where ‘long-range order’ is interpreted as the non-decay of correlations (see the re-
lated Appendix B).1 For example, Case 1 of Section 2.3 has no long-range order, but
Cases 2 and 3 possess long-range order. See also Remark 2.6.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. By Assumption 3.1,
Q = var
(∑
j
(Sj − wjχj)
)
since E(Sj) = E(χj) = 0
=
s∑
j=1
var(Sj − wjχj) since the Xj are independent.
By calculus, the last summand is a minimum when wj = E(Sjχj) as claimed. 
3.3. S lomczyn´ski/Z˙yczkowski and influence [50, 51, 55]. Let us concentrate on
the situation in which the entire vote-set (Xj(i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , Nj, j = 1, 2, . . . , s)
is a family of independent random variables. By independence, the absolute and
conditional influences (within States) are equal. The influence αj := αj(i) of a
member of State j is (asymptotically as Nj →∞) proportional to 1/
√
Nj, by (2.8).
The Penrose/Kirsch proposal of Section 3.2 amounts to wj = E|Sj | ∝
√
Nj . The
product αjwj is (asymptotically, for large Nj) constant across the States. This may
be seen as evidence that the voting system with this set of weights is ‘fair’ across the
union of the States.
How does one calculate the so-called ‘total influence’ of a given voter in the (w, q)
system? A given voter is pivotal overall if s/he is pivotal within the relevant State
vote, and furthermore the outcome of that vote is pivotal in the Council’s vote. By
Assumption 3.1, the total influence Ij of voter i in State j is the product
(3.4) Ij = αjβj ,
where βj = βj(w, q) is the influence of State j in the Council’s vote. (See [16, p. 67].)
We seek a pair (w, q) such that the total influences are equal (or nearly so) across
the States j.
The total influences Ij of (3.4) need not be proportional to the products αjwj of
the previous paragraph, since the ratios βj/wj are in general non-constant across
the States. A number of authors including S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski [55] have
developed the following approach.
1. Allocate to State j the weight wj =
√
Nj.
2. Calculate or estimate the State-influences βj as functions of (w, q).
1The term ‘long-range order’ arises in statistical mechanics in situations where random spins
σv are located at the vertices v of a lattice, such as the d-dimensional integer lattice Z
d, and the
correlation between two spins σv, σw does not approach 0 as the distance between v and w diverges.
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3. Identify a quota q such that βj is an approximately linear function of wj .
4. The ensuing products Ij = αjβj are approximately constant across States.
They have proposed choosing the quota q in (3.2) in such a way that, for the given
weights (wj), the sum of squared differences
Q :=
s∑
j=1
(wj − βj)2
is a minimum, where
wj =
100wj∑
k wk
, βj =
100βj∑
k βk
,
are the ‘normalised’ influences and weights, respectively (see Table 1). They present
numerical, empirical, and theoretical evidence that this is often achieved when q is
near
(3.5) q∗ :=
√
N∑
j
√
Nj
, where N =
s∑
j=1
Nj .
The theoretical foundation for this proposal lies in: (i) approximating βj by a Gauss-
ian integral, and (ii) picking q such that the integrand is close to linear in wj . The
latter step is achieved by finding the point at which the N(µ, σ2) Gaussian density
function has an inflection, and is thus locally closest to being locally linear. This
inflection is easily found by calculus to be at q := µ±σ, and this leads to the formula
(3.5).
In summary, they argue that, when wj =
√
Nj and q = q
∗, the βj = βj(w, q) are
close to the wj, and hence the total influences Ij = αjβj are close to the products
αjwj. Finally, since αj ∼ C/
√
Nj and wj =
√
Nj, the last product is asymptotically
constant across the States.
The above procedure is termed the Jagiellonian Compromise (or JagCom). We
discuss in Section 4 some aspects of the derivation of the quota q∗ in (3.5). Some
peripheral support for this choice of quota may be found in the analyses of ‘toy
models’ in [51, 53].
Remark 3.4. The weights wj are chosen first in the JagCom, and then the quota
q is chosen according to a linearisation argument. It may instead be preferable to
choose the parameters (w, q) in such a way that the deviation in the total influences
Ij is a minimum. See, for example, [33].
4. ‘Total influences’ in a two-tier system
4.1. Total influences. A mathematical derivation of the JagCom quota q∗, (3.5),
seems to require certain approximations which we discuss next. The first issue is to
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identify the purpose of the analysis. Let Ij be the total influence of a member of
State j, as in (3.4). One extreme way of achieving the near-equality of the Ij is to
set the quota q on the left side of (1.3) to be either −ǫ +∑j√Nj or its negation,
where ǫ > 0 is small. If we insist on such unanimity, we achieve
Ij = αj
(
1
2
)s
∼ C√
Nj
(
1
2
)s
.
For large s, these influences are nearly equal, indeed nearly equal to 0. Their ratios
however can be as large as
√
Nmax/Nmin, where Nmax (respectively, Nmin) is the
maximum (respectively, minimum) population size. An alternative target is that the
ratios Ij/Ik be as close to unity as possible, and a secondary target might be that
the total influences are as large as possible. We consider this next.
Consider a vote of the Council in which each State k has a preassigned weight
wk > 0. Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}. By (3.2), State j is pivotal for the outcome if: the set
J of States (other than j) voting for the motion is such that
(4.1) wJ + wj − wJ > qW, wJ − wj − wJ ≤ qW,
where J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s} \ {j}, J = {1, 2, . . . , s} \ (J ∪ {j}), and
wK :=
∑
k∈K
wk, K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s}.
Inequalities (4.1) may be written in the form qW − wj < Zj ≤ qW + wj where
(4.2) Zj = wJ − wJ =
∑
k 6=j
wkχk, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s},
and (χk : k = 1, 2, . . . , s) is a family of independent Bernoulli random variables with
P(χk = 1) = P(χk = −1) = 12 .
Therefore, State j is pivotal in the Council with probability
βj := P
(
qW − wj < Zj ≤ qW + wj
)
(4.3)
= FZj(qW + wj)− FZj (qW − wj),
where FZj is the distribution function of Zj . (Similar formulae appear in [51, App.].)
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski [55] argue that the FZj are ‘nearly’ Gaussian, and
they consider the appoximation
(4.4) βj ≈ 2wjφµj ,σj(qW )
where φµ,σ is the N(µ, σ
2) Gaussian density function, and
(4.5) µj = E(Zj) = 0, σ
2
j = var(Zj) =
∑
k 6=j
w2k.
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More precisely, (4.4) expresses the hypothesis that the distributions are nearly Gauss-
ian, and that the approximation is sufficiently uniform to be accurate to the first
order, in terms of the density function. They argue that the approximation is most
accurate when q is chosen in such a way that qW is a point of inflection of φµj ,σj ,
and this leads to the choice q = q∗, with q∗ as in (3.5). It is explained at the end of
Appendix C, to which the reader is referred for further details, that the ensuing ap-
proximations are good in the case of the population-sizes of the EU Member States,
but no proof is known to sufficient accuracy to permit the rigorous deduction of the
quota, q∗. The currently best theoretical tool for Gaussian approximations is the
so-called Berry–Esseen bound, and this is not good enough for our purpose here. See
Table 2.
4.2. The argument via numerical methods. Once one has accepted the thesis
that voters are independent and unbiased, there is a transparent logic to the choice
of weights wj =
√
Nj . Attention then turns to the choice of quota q. It is shown in
Appendix C that the mathematical argument of S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski [51],
while neat, is at best incomplete. In contrast, the numerical evidence of [49], in
favour of q = q∗, retains some persuasive power. Similar numerical work has been
carried out for the current article using QMV2017 population data taken from [44],
with the results reported in Table 1. These results are exact rather than being based
on simulation.
Table 1 lends some support to the choice q = q∗.
(a) The ratios of normalised influences βj to normalised weights wj are very close
to 1 when q = q∗.
(b) Further calculations show that the sum of squared differences Q =
∑
j(wj −
βj)
2, considered as a function of q = 0, 1
2
q∗, q∗, 3
2
q∗, is a minimum when q = q∗.
(More refined calculations are possible.)
We note, however, the following.
(i) The choice q = q∗ lacks transparency. In contrast, the choice q = 0 is simple
and easy to explain.
(ii) The ratios βj/wj are also close to 1 when q = 0. The agreement is not quite
so perfect as when q = q∗, but the differences are minor.
(iii) The sum Q is similarly close to 0 when q = 0, albeit not so close as when
q = q∗.
(iv) The influences βj are largest when q = 0. (See also [51, App.].)
In summary, the numerics are best when q = q∗, but the improvements relative to
the more transparent choice of q = 0 are minor. The numerical differences between
these two cases (and indeed other reasonable values of q) are so small that they are
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Member State weights q = 0 q = q∗
j wj wj βj βj βj/wj βj βj βj/wj
1 Germany 9.059 9.963 0.357 10.414 1.045 0.211 9.937 0.997
2 France 8.165 8.979 0.317 9.239 1.029 0.191 8.984 1.001
3 Italy 7.830 8.611 0.302 8.816 1.024 0.183 8.619 1.001
4 Spain 6.815 7.495 0.260 7.575 1.011 0.159 7.507 1.002
5 Poland 6.162 6.777 0.233 6.802 1.004 0.144 6.787 1.001
6 Romania 4.445 4.888 0.166 4.839 0.990 0.104 4.891 1.001
7 Netherlands 4.152 4.566 0.155 4.512 0.988 0.097 4.568 1.000
8 Belgium 3.360 3.695 0.125 3.636 0.984 0.078 3.696 1.000
9 Greece 3.285 3.613 0.122 3.554 0.984 0.077 3.613 1.000
10 Czech Rep. 3.232 3.554 0.120 3.495 0.983 0.075 3.554 1.000
11 Portugal 3.216 3.537 0.119 3.478 0.983 0.075 3.537 1.000
12 Sweden 3.162 3.477 0.117 3.418 0.983 0.074 3.477 1.000
13 Hungary 3.135 3.448 0.116 3.389 0.983 0.073 3.447 1.000
14 Austria 2.952 3.246 0.109 3.189 0.982 0.069 3.246 1.000
15 Bulgaria 2.675 2.942 0.099 2.886 0.981 0.062 2.941 1.000
16 Denmark 2.388 2.626 0.088 2.574 0.980 0.056 2.625 1.000
17 Finland 2.338 2.571 0.086 2.520 0.980 0.055 2.570 1.000
18 Slovakia 2.326 2.558 0.086 2.507 0.980 0.054 2.557 1.000
19 Ireland 2.160 2.375 0.080 2.327 0.980 0.050 2.374 1.000
20 Croatia 2.047 2.251 0.076 2.204 0.979 0.048 2.250 1.000
21 Lithuania 1.700 1.870 0.063 1.829 0.978 0.040 1.868 0.999
22 Slovenia 1.437 1.580 0.053 1.545 0.978 0.034 1.579 0.999
23 Latvia 1.403 1.543 0.052 1.508 0.977 0.033 1.542 0.999
24 Estonia 1.147 1.261 0.042 1.233 0.978 0.027 1.260 0.999
25 Cyprus 0.921 1.013 0.034 0.990 0.977 0.021 1.012 0.999
26 Luxembourg 0.759 0.835 0.028 0.815 0.976 0.018 0.834 0.999
27 Malta 0.659 0.725 0.024 0.708 0.977 0.015 0.724 0.999
Totals 90.930 100 3.429 100 2.123 100
Table 1. Member State j has weight wj =
√
Nj and normalised
weight wj = 100wj/W , where W =
∑
j wj . Two values of the quota
q are considered, namely, q = 0 and q = q∗ (see (3.5)). For each,
the influences βj have been computed, and the normalised influences
βj = 100βj/B are given above, where B =
∑
j βj . The ratios βj/wj are
presented alongside the βj. The ratios lie in the interval [0.976, 1.045]
when q = 0, and in the interval [0.997, 1.002] when q = q∗.
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unlikely to be separated by any technical analysis of the type of Appendix C. (See
also [54, Fig. 7].) We conclude the following.
1. On the basis of the theoretical and numerical evidence concerning the ratios
βj/wj, there is no convincing evidence that any one value of the quota is
materially preferable to any other.2
2. The total influences Ij are largest when q = 0.
5. Some remarks on the Jagiellonian Compromise
Theoreticians propose, politicians dispose (and certain Presidents of the United
States have historically played on both teams). Members of each group have interests
and potential conflicts. The theoretician earns respect through honest assessment
of the virtues (or not) of, and principles underlying, a particular proposal. They
hope that politicians will accord fair weight and balance to principled proposals
irrespective of personal advantage. While theoreticians are usually free of conflicts
arising out of employment within a politically aligned organization, politicians are
usually heavily conflicted (see, for example, [44]).
Communication between the two groups can be challenging. The use of language
such as ‘local limit theorem’ and ‘Berry–Esseen bound’ tends to create barriers. Such
methodology is however key to proper study of the two-tier voting system of Sections
3–4, and practitioners have worked diligently to communicate its relevance.
The JagCom proposes the use of square-root weights wj =
√
Nj with a specific
choice of the quota q. Each of these two proposals will rightly continue to attract
critical discussion.
The square-root weights of equation (1.1) and Proposition 3.3 may be justified if:
(i) there is no bias, and (ii) there is no ‘long-range order’ (in the language of statistical
mechanics). Each of these assumptions seems over-perfectionist. Issues before the
Council may be systematically more popular in some States than in others, and the
consequent biases risk undermining either or both of the above two assumptions. The
‘collective bias’ model of Kirsch and others (see Section 2) is both more flexible and
more empirical, at serious cost to the square-root laws for influence and majority
(see [29]). Other authors have considered the effect on weights of introducing a
concave utility function (see Koriyama et al. [31]). Such approaches give rise to
weight distributions which, in turn, benefit from calibration against the politics and
practical workings of the Council. The right choice of weights is not a simple matter of
finding some neat mathematics. That said, no concrete proposal to displace square-
root weights in the JagCom is made in the current work.
2Large positive or negative values are evidently poor, but we consider here only values q such
that qW/
√
N has order 1. Other choices for q have been considered in, for example, [10, 13].
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Having chosen the weights, the identification of the quota is subject to similar
ambiguities. The JagCom ‘exact’ quota q∗ of (3.5) hinges on the assumptions of
square-root weights and equality of absolute influence, in combination with numerical
data and the Gaussian approximation of Appendix C. The last is unproven in the
current context of the QMV2017 population data of the States of the EU.
In their favour, the proposed square-root weights and the exact quota q∗ of the
JagCom have been derived via a set of principles that can be stated unambigu-
ously and analysed fairly rigorously, and which are robust with respect to changes
in population data. Proponents argue that they are thus less susceptible than many
alternatives to ‘political meddling’.
We turn now to the numerics of the JagCom quota q∗. If the ratios βj/wj in Table
1 are close to 1, then the total influences Ij = αjβj of (3.4) are almost constant
across Member States. As indicated in the shaded columns of the table, this holds
for both q = 0 and q = q∗ (they are nearly perfect when q = q∗, and very close for
other values of q). Indeed this holds for a range of values of q including the values
0 and q∗ (see also [54]). One may deduce that, from a practical point of view, there
is little to choose between different values of q. This may be a situation in which
political considerations may have the final word. It seems generally considered to be
the case that there is no enthusiasm amongst politicians for the choice q = 0, on
the grounds that a body such as the EU Council should seek a compromise between
simple majority and unanimity.
Overall, the details of the JagCom rely on a number of assumptions that are ar-
guably fragile and/or unrealistic. This potential weakness needs to be acknowledged
when making the case for the JagCom. The JagCom is a legitimate proposal for
the two-tier voting system of the Council of the EU, whose finer details may profit
from input by politicians in choosing a system judged to serve well the needs of the
nearly 450 million residents of the 27 Member States of the European Union without
the United Kingdom. Our closing quote (Machover [38, Abs.]) accords a balanced
responsibility to both theoreticians and politicians: “This is essentially a political
matter; but a political decision ought to be made in a theoretically enlightened way.”
Appendix A. Circular voting
In Definition 2.1, condition (ii) is weaker than requiring that X be exchangeable
(see [24, p. 324]). Here is a simple one-dimensional example of a random vector
that is symmetric but not exchangeable. Suppose the m (≥ 4) voters are distributed
evenly around a circular table. Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zm be the outcomes of m independent
tosses of a fair coin that shows the values ±1. Let X(i) be the majority value of Zi−1,
Zi, Zi+1, with the convention that Zm+k = Zk for all k (and a similar convention for
the X(i)). It may be checked that X(i) and X(j) are independent if and only if i
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and j are distance 3 or more away from each other. The joint distribution of X is
invariant under the rotation i 7→ i+ 1 modulo m, and is hence symmetric.
Similar examples may be constructed in two and higher dimensions. In models
that incorporate a spatial element in the relationships between individual voters,
symmetry may be a reasonable assumption when exchangeability is not.
Appendix B. ‘Ferromagnetic voting’
Kirsch [26] proposed studying the voting problem via the analogy of a ferromag-
netic model, such as the classical Ising model. He concentrated on the so-called
Curie–Weiss (or mean-field) model, in which each vertex v of the complete graph has
a random spin σv taking values in {−1, 1} according to a certain probability distri-
bution dictated by the so-called Ising model. The reader is referred to his paper for
further details.
The analysis is especially simple in this so-called ‘mean-field’ case since the com-
plete graph has the maximum of symmetry. The mean-field case is, in a sense familiar
to mathematical physicists, an infinite-dimensional model. We note that similar re-
sults are fairly immediate for the more pertinent finite-dimensional systems also, as
follows. For concreteness, let d ≥ 1 and let Tn be the d-dimensional torus obtained
from the square grid {0, 1, . . . , n}d with periodic boundary conditions. Let βc be
the critical value of the inverse-temperature β of the Ising model on Zd (we refer to
[22, 23] for explanations of the model and notation). Interpreting σv as the vote of
an individual placed at the vertex v, the aggregate vote
S =
∑
v∈Tn
σv
satisfies
(B.1) E|S| ≈
{
nd/2 if β < βc,
nd if β > βc.
The bibliography associated with the Ising model and its ramifications is extended
and complex, and is directed mostly at the corresponding infinite-volume problem
defined on the entire d-dimensional space Zd. Some of the above claims for periodic
boundary conditions are well known, and others may be derived from classical results.
The relevant literature includes [1, 14, 40].
Appendix C. Gaussian approximation
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski argue that the distribution function FZj in (4.3) is
‘roughly’ Gaussian with mean and variance given by (4.5). Motivated by the local
central limit theorem for non-identically distributed random variables (see [24, p.
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195] and [18], or otherwise), we aspire to a Gaussian approximation of (4.3) of the
form
βj ≈
∫ qW+wj
qW−wj
φσj (z) dz ≈ 2wjφσj(qW )(C.1)
=
2wj√
2πσ2j
exp
(
−(qW )
2
2σ2j
)
,
where φσ is the density function of the N(0, σ
2) Gaussian distribution. (No suffi-
ciently accurate estimate of the error in the first approximation of (C.1) is currently
available.) This leads to the following approximation for the total influence of a voter
in State j:
Ij = αjβj ≃ C√
Nj
2wj√
∆2 − w2j
exp
(
−1
2
· (qW )
2
(∆2 − w2j )
)
,
where C > 0 is an absolute constant, and
∆2 =
s∑
k=1
w2k.
Let δ = Nmax/N , and set wj =
√
Nj. (A similar anaysis is valid with wj set to the
mean edge of Remark 1.1.)
(a) If we set q = q∗ as in (3.5), we obtain the approximate inequalities
(C.2)
2C
∆
e−1/[2(1−δ)]  Ij = αjβj  2C
∆
√
1− δ e
−1/2, j = 1, 2, . . . , s,
with ∆ =
√
N . (The symbol  is used in order to indicate that the inequal-
ities are based on the unquantified approximation (C.1).) These bounds are
independent of the choice of j, and are increasingly close to one another in
the limit as δ → 0.
(b) If, instead, we set q = 0, we obtain the inequalities (C.2) with the exponential
terms removed.
The exact numerical values of the βj are calculated in Section 4.2 for the particular
case of the 27 Member States of the European Union post-Brexit.
The above analysis depends on two Assumptions:
1. the normal (or Gaussian) approximation (C.1) is reasonable,
2. the ratio δ = Nmax/N is small.
Assumption 2 is unavoidable in some form, and its use within (C.2) is quantified
therein. We therefore concentrate henceforth on Assumption 1. The approximation
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of (C.1) is a statement about a finite population, and thus one needs a rate of
convergence in the central limit theorem. The classical such result is as follows.
Theorem C.1 (Berry–Esseen [7, 15, 48]). There exists C ∈ [0.4906, 0.5600] such
that the following holds. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xs be independent random variables with
E(Xi) = 0, E(X
2
i ) = t
2
i > 0, E(|Xi|3) = γi <∞,
and write
σ2 =
s∑
i=1
t2i , S =
1
σ
s∑
i=1
Xi.
Then
sup
z∈R
∣∣P(S ≤ z)− Φ(z)∣∣ ≤ C
σ3
∑
i
γi,
where Φ is the distribution function of the N(0, 1) distribution.
Applying this to the random variable Zj of (4.2), we obtain
sup
z∈R
∣∣FZj (z)− Φσj (z)∣∣ = sup
z∈R
∣∣P (Zj/σj ≤ z)− Φ(z)∣∣(C.3)
≤ C
∑
k 6=j w
3
k(∑
k 6=j w
2
k
)3/2 ,
where σ2j is given in (4.5), and Φσ is the distribution function of the N(0, σ
2) distri-
bution. Therefore, by (4.3) (see (C.1)),
(C.4)
∣∣∣∣∣βj −
∫ qW+wj
qW−wj
φσj (z) dz
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2C
∑
k 6=j w
3
k(∑
k 6=j w
2
k
)3/2 ,
where 2C ≤ 1.12.
Example C.2 (EU27). Suppose s = 27 and the State populations N1, N2, . . . , N27
are the QMV2017 figures for the Member States of the EU, as in [44, Table 1]. We
write N1 > N2 > · · · > N27, so that Nmax = N1, and we choose wj =
√
Nj and
q = q∗ with q∗ as in (3.5).
The integral on the left side of (C.4) may be expressed as
(C.5)
∫ (√N+wj)/√N−Nj
(
√
N−wj)/
√
N−Nj
φ(z) dz,
where φ = φ0. Its numerical value decreases monotonically from 0.207 (when j = 1)
to 0.015 (when j = 27). The Berry–Esseen bound on the right side of (C.4) takes
the value 0.332 (when j = 1), 0.349 (when j = 5), and 0.334 (when j = 27), and
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Member State q = 0 q = q∗
j exact JagCom BE interval exact JagCom BE interval
1 Germany 0.357 0.379 [0.03, 0.70] 0.211 0.205 [−0.13, 0.54]
3 Italy 0.302 0.319 [−0.03, 0.65] 0.183 0.178 [−0.17, 0.52]
5 Poland 0.233 0.244 [−0.11, 0.59] 0.144 0.141 [−0.21, 0.49]
7 Netherlands 0.155 0.160 [−0.19, 0.50] 0.097 0.095 [−0.25, 0.44]
9 Greece 0.122 0.126 [−0.22, 0.47] 0.077 0.075 [−0.27, 0.42]
11 Portugal 0.119 0.123 [−0.22, 0.46] 0.075 0.074 [−0.27, 0.41]
13 Hungary 0.116 0.120 [−0.22, 0.46] 0.073 0.072 [−0.27, 0.41]
15 Bulgaria 0.099 0.102 [−0.24, 0.44] 0.062 0.061 [−0.28, 0.40]
17 Finland 0.086 0.089 [−0.25, 0.43] 0.055 0.054 [−0.28, 0.39]
19 Ireland 0.080 0.082 [−0.26, 0.42] 0.050 0.050 [−0.29, 0.39]
21 Lithuania 0.063 0.064 [−0.27, 0.40] 0.040 0.039 [−0.30, 0.37]
23 Latvia 0.052 0.053 [−0.28, 0.39] 0.033 0.032 [−0.30, 0.37]
25 Cyprus 0.034 0.035 [−0.30, 0.37] 0.021 0.021 [−0.31, 0.36]
27 Malta 0.024 0.025 [−0.31, 0.36] 0.015 0.015 [−0.32, 0.35]
Table 2. Numerical data for odd values of j and the quotas q = 0 and
q∗. Three values are given in each case: the exact value of the State-
influence βj as in Table 1 (labelled exact), the approximation (4.4)
(labelled JagCom), and the rigorous interval for the State-influence
calculated by the Berry–Esseen bound (C.4) (labelled BE interval).
Note the close agreement between the exact values and the JagCom
approximations in all cases, and especially so when q = q∗. The rigor-
ous Berry–Esseen bound is insufficient to rule out even βj = 0 except in
the unique case q = q∗, j = 1. The calculations involving the Gaussian
distribution have been performed using Microsoft Excel.
is monotone on each of the two intervals j ∈ [1, 5] and j ∈ [5, 27]. The bounds are
too large to yield useful information about the βj, and thus they cannot be estimated
using the Berry–Esseen bound. In contrast, the values of the integral in (C.5) are
notably close to the exact values of Table 1. A similar analysis is valid when q = 0.
This numerical information is summarised in Table 2.
We emphasise that the above observations do not invalidate the JagCom. Prefer-
able to the Berry–Esseen bound would be a sufficiently precise rate of convergence in
the local central limit theorem for discrete, non-identically distributed random vari-
ables. We are unaware of such a result.
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We return to the question of the accuracy of the two approximations in (C.1) (see
also (4.4)). Although this has not been investigated systematically in the current
work, exploratory numerical calculations have been performed with a Union of 20
States, in which Nmax/N is approximately that of EU27 with QMV2017. All such
calculations indicate that the left side of (C.4) is only rarely greater than 10−2, and
this is positive evidence for the Gaussian approximation with general population
figures comparable to those of EU27.
The approximation (4.4) amounts to a further approximation around q∗, based
upon the near-linearity of the Gaussian density function near a point of inflection.
The empirical evidence indicates, as above, that the discrepancy is generally less
than 10−2.
We conclude this appendix as follows. No mathematical proof is known of the
optimality of the choice (3.5) of the quota q∗ in the JagCom for general population
distributions. Even if a rate can be proved in the appropriate central limit theorem, it
is unlikely to be sufficiently tight to justify the choice q∗. Numerical data is, however,
positive.
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